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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his opening brief, Andres Avila argued the district court erred in concluding it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Avila’s motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(“Rule 35”) because the motion was filed within 120 days of the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and was thus timely.  In its brief, the State concedes Mr. Avila’s 
Rule 35 motion was timely; however, the State argues this Court should dismiss 
Mr. Avila’s appeal because he waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion when he entered 
into an agreement with the State on February 25, 2013 to plead guilty to possession of 
a controlled substance.  The State did not raise this argument in the district court and it 
was not the basis for the district court’s decision.  In any event, it is clear from the 
record that the district court did not accept the parties’ written plea agreement and thus, 
even if Mr. Avila could prospectively waive his right to file a Rule 35 motion challenging 
the district court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction, his waiver is not enforceable.  To the 
extent there is any ambiguity regarding the interpretation and/or enforceability of the 
Rule 35 waiver contained in the parties’ written plea agreement, this Court should not 
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the State in the first instance, but should remand this 
case to the district court for consideration of the issue.     
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Avila included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his opening 
brief.  (App. Br., pp. 1-2.)  He includes this section here only to set forth the additional 
facts pertinent to the State’s argument on appeal. 
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On February 25, 2013, Mr. Avila filed in the district court a Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement (“the written plea agreement”) which reflects that Mr. Avila and the State 
agreed that Mr. Avila would plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance and, in 
exchange, the State would dismiss a misdemeanor charge and the district court would 
sentence Mr. Avila to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed, which 
sentence would be suspended.  (R., pp.31-35.)  The written plea agreement was 
intended to be binding on the district court.  The written plea agreement states, in 
pertinent part:  “Defendant further understands that since this is a sentence he is 
agreeing to and [that is] binding on the court, that he waives his right to request relief in 
the form of lenience under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.”  (R., p.33.)  The written plea 
agreement was signed by Mr. Avila, Mr. Avila’s counsel, and the prosecutor, but it was 
not signed by the district court judge.  (R., p.34.) 
The district court held a hearing on February 25, 2013, at which it accepted 
Mr. Avila’s guilty plea.  (R., p.28.)  However, the district court did not accept the terms of 
the written plea agreement and refused to be bound by the parties’ agreed-upon 
sentence.  (R., p.28.)  Instead, the district court stated it would review all the information 
provided at sentencing and would determine the appropriate sentence at that time.  
(R., p.28.)  The district court told Mr. Avila it was not required to sentence him in 
accordance with the written plea agreement.  (R., p.28.) 
 At sentencing, the district court stated it would sentence Mr. Avila in accordance 
with the parties’ agreed-upon sentence. (R., p.48.)  However, the district court never 
executed the written plea agreement.  (R., p.34.)  And it does not appear from the 
record that the district court advised Mr. Avila at sentencing that he had waived his right 
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to appeal from his sentence or file a Rule 35 motion.  On the contrary, the court minutes 
of the sentencing hearing state “[t]he [c]ourt advised the defendant with regards to his 
post judgment rights.”  (R., p.34.)  The judgment, filed May 2, 2013, likewise does not 
reference an appellate waiver or Rule 35 waiver.  (R., pp.50-53.) 
 On January 16, 2015, the district court revoked Mr. Avila’s probation, executed 
his sentence, and retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days.  (R., pp.105-09.)  On 
August 3, 2015, the district court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction over 
Mr. Avila, without holding a hearing.  (R., pp.110-11.)  On November 19, 2015, Mr. Avila 
filed a pro se Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence and objection to the Addendum 
to the Presentence Investigation Report (“APSI”).  (R., pp.112-16.)  The State did not 
file an objection or otherwise respond to Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion.  The district court 
denied Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing, concluding the motion was 
untimely, and it thus lacked jurisdiction to consider it.  (R., pp.129-31.)  The district court 
never considered whether Mr. Avila waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion challenging 
the district court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction.   
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion? 
 
2. Did Mr. Avila waive his right to file a Rule 35 motion challenging the district 






The District Court Erred When It Concluded It Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider 
Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
In his opening brief, Mr. Avila argued the district court erred when it concluded it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion because the motion was 
timely.  (App. Br., pp. 4-5.)  In its brief, the State “acknowledges that [Mr.] Avila’s motion 
was timely filed.”  (Resp. Br., p.2.)  Because the district court erred in concluding it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion, this Court should vacate the 
district court’s order denying the motion and remand this case to the district court to 




Mr. Avila Did Not Waive His Right To File A Rule 35 Motion Challenging The District 
Court’s Relinquishment Of Jurisdiction 
 
 Although the State acknowledges that Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion was timely 
filed, the State requests that this Court “dismiss [Mr.] Avila’s appeal because he waived 
his right to appeal his sentence and file a Rule 35 motion.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  The State 
is incorrect.  Mr. Avila did not waive his right to file a Rule 35 motion because the written 
plea agreement which contained the Rule 35 waiver was never executed by the district 
court and is thus not enforceable.  Even if the written plea agreement were enforceable, 
it would not, as a matter of law, bar Mr. Avila from filing a Rule 35 motion challenging 
the district court’s August 3, 2015 order relinquishing jurisdiction over him. 
On February 25, 2013, Mr. Avila entered into a written plea agreement with the 
State which contained both an appellate waiver and a Rule 35 waiver.  (R., pp.31-35.)  
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The written plea agreement was not accepted by the district court.  (R., p.28.)  Mr. Avila 
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance on February 25, 2013, without 
receiving any guarantee that the district court would impose the sentence agreed upon 
by the parties.  (R., p.28.)  The written plea agreement states, in pertinent part, that 
Mr. Avila “understands that since this is a sentence he is agreeing to and [that is] 
binding on the court, that he waives his right to request relief in the form of lenience 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.”  (R., p.33.)   It is black letter law that “[a] plea agreement 
is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law standards.”  State v. 
Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000) (citations omitted).  Under general standards of 
contract law, because the district court did not accept the written plea agreement, the 
Rule 35 motion contained in the written plea agreement is not enforceable.   
Even if the written plea agreement were enforceable, the Rule 35 waiver 
contained in that agreement would not bar Mr. Avila from filing a Rule 35 motion 
challenging the district court’s August 3, 2015 order relinquishing jurisdiction over him.  
In interpreting the language of a plea agreement waiver, the critical inquiry is whether 
the post-sentencing proceeding arguably waived by the defendant was contemplated by 
the parties during their plea negotiations.  See State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 614-15 
(1995).  Here, Mr. Avila could not have contemplated when he was negotiating with the 
State back in February 2013 that he might be waiving his right to challenge the district 
court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction over two years later, without a hearing or other 
opportunity to be heard.  The district court made no factual findings in this regard 
because the State did not argue in the district court that Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 motion was 
barred by the written plea agreement.  The State can raise this issue on remand, and 
 7 
the district court can consider it when it considers the merits of Mr. Avila’s Rule 35 
motion.  The State cites no authority which suggests that this Court can resolve in the 
first instance the fact-specific questions regarding the enforceability and applicability of 
the Rule 35 waiver contained in the written plea agreement.  “Appellate courts are 
forums of review, not decision in the first instance.”  State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 
368 (Ct. App. 2015).     
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and those in his opening brief, Mr. Avila 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 
35 motion and remand this case to the district court for a determination on the merits.   
 DATED this 29th day of July, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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